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The Guardian, in collaboration with the University of Cambridge Department of Computer Science, launches open-source Secure Messaging (www.theguardian.com)

submitted 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago) by Davriellelouna@lemmy.world to c/cybersecurity@sh.itjust.works

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[–] jesse@sh.itjust.works 9 points 1 day ago (1 children)

This is their comment about how it compares to Signal:

End-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging apps like Signal and WhatsApp provide strong confidentiality of the message content. However, they do not hide communication patterns, such as who is communicating with whom and when. In addition, users cannot plausibly deny the existence of conversations if they are forced to unlock their smartphone. CoverDrop provides both strong metadata privacy, hiding who is communicating with whom and when, and plausible deniability, even where an adversary has physical access to the device and asks the user to unlock it.

I thought when Signal added sealed sender it was to make it hard to analyze traffic patterns on the server side. Signal would make it harder to deny communicating with someone if your phone is unlocked as even conversations with disappearing messages don't disappear themselves as I recall.

I am all for more secure communication, but in my mind, anything in this space needs to demonstrate how it's fundamentally better than signal. For the general use case that's typically pretty hard.

[–] JoeKrogan@lemmy.world 1 points 17 hours ago (1 children)

Also you could have the messages disappear after being read that way there is nothing on the phone except the contact of the person

[–] jesse@sh.itjust.works 2 points 13 hours ago

Absolutely, I read what this new app is trying to do as hide who you have talked to. If your phone does get searched, you ideally don't want people asking "hey, why do you have a disappearing chat with this Journalist who is writing stuff we don't like".

The flip side of that is that Signal has now gotten some traction with the guttural public, so there is (I would think) better plausible deniability having Signal installed than a relatively obscure/new secure messaging app that's for talking to journalists anonymously.