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• Iran has sold nearly $3 billion worth of missiles to Russia to aid President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, according to a Western security official.
• The purchases have included hundreds of Fath-360 short-range ballistic missiles, nearly 500 other short-range ballistic missiles and approximately 200 surface-to-air missiles.
• Russia has spent more than the equivalent of $4 billion on Iranian military equipment since late 2021.

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Contracts with Moscow starting from October 2021 — before the war began — for ballistic and surface-to-air missiles amount to roughly $2.7 billion, said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

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Moscow and Tehran have drawn closer since Putin’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has triggered sweeping sanctions against Moscow and the Kremlin’s most serious confrontation with the West since the Cold War, while Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia has further deepened the two countries’ partnership.

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Iran has delivered millions of rounds of ammunition and shells, according to the assessment, which doesn’t represent the entirety of what Moscow has purchased from Tehran as more equipment is expected to be supplied.

Tehran has also supplied Shahed-136 “kamikaze” drones and shared technology that has enabled Russia to manufacture them domestically under the name “Geran-2” as part of a $1.75 billion contract signed at the beginning of 2023.

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Iran, whose government is crushing ongoing violent protests, sought to deepen its ties with Russia starting in the 2010s, smarting from the West’s ability to isolate it over the country’s nuclear program.

While Iran signed a strategic partnership with Russia in January 2025, it doesn’t contain a mutual-defense pact and Moscow didn’t offer any tangible assistance to Tehran during Israeli and US strikes on Iran last year. Russia is building a trade route with Tehran connecting to India to try to weaken the impact of sanctions, and officials have discussed boosting financial and banking cooperation.

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Polina Azarnykh, a 40-year-old former teacher, uses a Telegram channel to lure young men, often from poor countries, into joining Russia's military.

The former teacher's smiling video messages and upbeat posts offer "one-year contracts" for "military service".

The BBC World Service has identified nearly 500 cases where she has provided documents, referred to as invitations, which allow the recipient to enter Russia to join the military. These have been for men - mainly from Syria, Egypt and Yemen - who appear to have sent her their passport details in order to enlist.

But recruits and their relatives have told the BBC that she misled men into believing they would avoid combat, failed to make clear they could not leave after a year and threatened those who challenged her. When contacted by the BBC, she rejected the allegations.

Twelve families told us of young men they say were recruited by her who are now dead or missing.

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Azarnykh's Telegram channel has 21,000 subscribers. Her posts have often told readers wanting to apply to join the Russian military to send her a scan of their passport. She has then posted invitation documents, sometimes with a list of names of the men they are for.

The BBC has identified more than 490 such invitations that she has sent over the past year to men from countries including Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Iraq, Ivory Coast and Nigeria.

Her posts have mentioned recruitment for an "elite international battalion" and made it clear that people in Russia illegally - including those whose visas have expired - are eligible.

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Many felt Azarnykh had misled or exploited recruits. They told us the men knew they were joining the military, but did not expect to serve on the front line. Several, like Omar, felt they had inadequate training or thought they would be able to leave after a year.

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Azarnykh became "one of the most important recruiters" for Russia's army, says Habib, another Syrian who has served in Russia's military. He was willing to be filmed but spoke under a pseudonym for fear of repercussions.

Habib says he and Azarnykh "worked together for around three years on visa invitations to Russia". He gave no further details and we have not been able to confirm his role in the process. An image from social media in 2024 shows him alongside her.

Azarnykh, who is from Russia's south-western Voronezh region, ran a Facebook group helping Arab students come to Moscow to study, before starting her Telegram channel in 2024.

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Azarnykh's posts from mid-2024 begin to note that recruits will be "participating in hostilities" and mention foreign fighters who have died in combat.

"You all understood well that you were going to war," she says in one video in October 2024. "You thought that you could get a Russian passport, do nothing and live in a five-star hotel?... Nothing happens for free."

In another case, in 2024, the BBC has heard a voice message sent by Azarnykh to a mother whose son was serving in the military. Azarnykh says the woman has "published something horrible about the Russian army". Using expletives, she threatens the son's life and warns the woman: "I'll find you and all your children."

The BBC made multiple attempts to contact Azarnykh. Initially she said she would do an interview with us if we travelled to Russia, but the BBC declined for safety reasons. Later, when asked in a voice call about claims that recruits were promised non-combat roles, she hung up. In voice notes sent afterwards, she said our work was "not professional" and warned of potential defamation proceedings. She also said: "Our respected Arabs can stick their accusations up their arses."

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Chinese officials are using a ‘highly specific’ interpretation of EU rules to suggest Taiwanese figures should not be granted visas, EU officials say.

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Chinese officials have been pushing “legal advice” on European countries, saying their own border laws require them to ban entry to Taiwanese politicians, according to more than half a dozen diplomats and officials familiar with the matter.

The officials made demarches to European embassies in Beijing, or through local embassies directly to European governments in their capital cities, warning the European countries not to “trample on China’s red lines”, according to the European diplomats and ministries who spoke to the Guardian.

The manner of the approaches varied – some to individual countries and some as groups, some by written note verbale (a semiformal diplomatic communication) and others in person. They occurred in November and December, and were at least partly in response to recent European trips by Taiwanese officials including its current vice-president and foreign minister, and a former president.

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Beijing said it “respects the sovereignty of the European side in introducing and implementing visa policy”, but an “institutional loophole” had allowed frequent visits by Taiwan politicians.

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The officials’ suggestion, the Guardian understands, was that allowing Taiwanese officials to enter a European country would threaten that country’s international relations with China.

In some cases they also referred to the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations, or suggested the European countries follow the UN’s example and bar all Taiwanese people from government buildings, the Guardian was told.

“Beijing’s application and interpretation of this regulation is bold,” said Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, assistant professor at Taiwan’s National Dong Hwa University, when told about the moves. “It is Beijing’s interpretation that EU-Taiwan ties threaten EU-China ties. This is not at all the perception or reality in Europe.”

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The [Chinese] note verbale said European countries should reject any “so-called diplomatic passports” issued by Taiwan, and “prohibit Taiwanese personnel from entering Europe to seek official contact and exchanges and trample on China’s red line”.

“China hopes the EU institutions and European countries will, out of the larger interests of China-EU relations and bilateral relations, make the political decision of refusing the entry of Taiwan’s so-called president or vice president (former ones included),” it said, also listing other officials.

The note cited visits by the officials to Belgium, the Czech Republic, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy, Australia, Germany, Lithuania, Denmark, Estonia and Ireland, saying they “seriously undermine China-EU relations”.

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“The European side … even indulged [vice-president] Hsiao Bi-khim to speak at the building of the European parliament and promote ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist claims,” it said, referring to a speech given by Hsiao to the annual summit of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (Ipac) in Brussels.

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A spokesperson for the UK Foreign Office said: “Permission to enter the UK is determined solely by our own laws and immigration rules, which apply equally to those travelling from Taiwan.”

Taiwan’s foreign ministry said officials’ visits to Europe were “entirely unrelated to China, and China has no right to interfere”.

“On the contrary, China’s use of various coercive measures against other countries and its threats of force against Taiwan, which undermine global and Indo-Pacific peace and stability and threaten the direct interests of the EU, is the real force damaging European international relations,” the spokesperson told the Guardian.

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“I see this as another way to generate unease among member states that their relations with the [People’s Republic of China] might be at risk … and Beijing knows well that some EU member states are very keen to attract Chinese investment at present,” said Ferenczy.

The EU does not take a position on Taiwan’s status, and while it has formal relations with Beijing it also maintains “solid” unofficial relations with Taipei through parliamentary diplomacy and trade. Several European countries and the EU have trade offices that act as unofficial embassies in Taipei.

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However in recent years the bloc has come under increasing pressure from Beijing, which claims Taiwan as a province of China, and intends to annex it – by force if necessary. Among its strategies to coerce Taiwan into accepting unification without conflict, Beijing puts intense diplomatic pressure on the international community to isolate Taipei from multilateral engagement.

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According to Kyiv Police, the ninth-grade student entered a classroom wearing a mask and helmet after preparing them in advance and attacked a 39-year-old teacher and a 14-year-old classmate with a knife. Both victims were hospitalized with stab and cut wounds, and doctors are assessing the severity of their injuries.

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Police said the student later locked himself in a restroom and inflicted knife wounds to his arm and abdomen. He was taken to hospital and is receiving medical care.

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During investigative actions, law enforcement officers found messages on the suspect’s phone indicating possible communication with hostile foreign intelligence services, police said, without providing further details.

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Shortly before Christmas, the new chief of [Secret Intelligence Service ] MI6, Blaise Metreweli, made her first public speech since taking charge. She chose as her subject the multifaceted threat posed by Russia, warning of the growing danger from Vladimir Putin’s regime. “We are operating in a space between peace and war,” she said.

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The picture Metreweli paints is frightening: a scenario not of overt military strikes, but of covert “grey zone” assaults from every angle. The spy chief did not go into detail. We are all aware of the existence of planned sabotage, assassinations, hacking, cyber crime and drone attacks. Such concepts are well aired and are firmly embedded in the public consciousness. Less familiar, however, according to security experts, is the notion of economic warfare. Key to this, to use their parlance, are non-state actors – not Russian diplomats or entities formally associated with the Russian state, but private individuals, organisations, movements and companies who secretly act in Russia’s interest.

Some are ideologically motivated, while others do it for money, frequently being paid in untraceable cryptocurrency, like Jan Marsalek. Austrian-born Marsalek was COO of Wirecard, the German payment processing firm that collapsed in 2020 after announcing that €1.9bn (£1.65bn) it supposedly held in cash did not in fact exist.

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For almost a decade prior to its insolvency, Marsalek had been working for the Russian security agency, the GRU. His position at Wirecard gave him access to data and resources that were useful to the Russians. He used his seniority to develop pro-Russian links in Libya, and to encourage a flood of migration to Europe that was calculated to cause social and financial damage – all playing into Moscow’s hands.

After his exposure, following Wirecard’s collapse, Marsalek fled to Russia. In late 2023, Marsalek was named again as the coordinator of a Bulgarian spy ring operating in the UK.

Another example is petty criminal Dylan Earl, the ringleader in an arson attack on a warehouse in east London stocked with aid for Ukraine in March 2024. He was also recruited online by the Russian paramilitary organisation known as the Wagner Group.

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Harder to crack are the Russians or non-Russians working in the commercial field, in strategic industries critical to Europe’s defence and infrastructure, such as defence and energy, and acting in Russia’s interests, often under orders from the GRU or other Kremlin agencies. Security sources maintain that Moscow considers these actors useful as there is a degree of separation: deniability is fundamental to the strategy.

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The difficulty of tracking such activity can be seen in the case of Alexander Kirzhnev. The Russian is wanted by the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court in Ukraine, having been accused in absentia of organising a fraud against Ukraine by using a bogus US company to fulfil an order for ammunition.

The Ukraine state-owned firm Artem placed a multimillion-dollar order for 152mm and 155mm shells with a supplier based in Florida. Advance payment was made. All seemed well: a US firm was helping Ukraine’s war effort, no problem there. The trouble was, the Florida company had no ability to fulfil the order.

By diverting precious Ukrainian cash, taking up their time and effort, and making them think much-needed military supplies were coming when they were not, Kirzhnev’s alleged actions – whether under instruction or not – epitomise Russia’s goals in the “grey zone”: deniable private-sector activity that moves the Kremlin closer to its strategic objectives, sowing uncertainty along the way.

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Today, the biggest news comes from Northern Europe.

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After months of unexplained damage beneath the Baltic Sea, Finland has moved into action by intercepting a vessel directly linked to the cable cuts. For the first time, a Russian operation that relied on distance and unclear responsibility has been exposed through enforcement rather than inference.

Finland intercepted and exposed a Russian-linked civilian vessel connected to the cutting of underwater cables between Finland and Estonia, marking the first time one of these grey-zone operations has been confronted directly at sea.

Footage released by Finnish authorities shows a controlled interception unfolding step by step in open waters, starting with Finnish patrol vessels pulling alongside and ordering the ship to slow and hold its course.

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This incident fits into a broader Russian campaign targeting underwater infrastructure across the Baltic Sea, where power cables and data lines form the backbone of everyday life. Over recent months, multiple fiber-optic and power cables linking Nordic states have been cut or damaged under suspicious circumstances, often near known shipping lanes.

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While there was broad agreement that these incidents were not random, the lack of direct attribution prevented authorities from acting beyond repairs and diplomatic warnings. The aim has created disruption that creates uncertainty, repair costs, and political hesitation without triggering a direct military response.

The method is simple and hard to counter, because civilian vessels move slowly along established shipping routes, blend into dense maritime traffic, and operate in areas where cables are known to run.

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The breakthrough came when investigators confirmed not only that the vessel was operating along sensitive seabed routes during the cable damage, but also that it was carrying sanctioned steel products.

This turned a pattern of suspicion into a provable violation, allowing Finnish authorities to move immediately from monitoring to action using existing law. Instead of another case of accidental damage in busy waters followed by statements and quiet inquiries, Finland now had clear grounds to act openly and decisively.

By anchoring the response in documented violations rather than intent or attribution debates, Moscow's usual escape route of denial and ambiguity collapsed the moment the cargo was recorded.

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For years, grey-zone operations have thrived because responses stopped at warnings, investigations, or diplomatic pressure. This case establishes a different precedent, as intelligence collection tied to legal preparation and immediate enforcement, allowing states to act publicly without escalating militarily.

Operationally, it lowers the threshold for boarding and inspection, politically it removes the need to argue intent, and legally it shifts the burden onto Russia to explain documented violations rather than deny them.

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This case shows another path, as it shows that intelligence gathering, legal preparation, and enforcement can be combined into a response that exposes the operation without turning it into a military confrontation. Once a ship is boarded and its cargo documented, the shield that protects hybrid warfare disappears.

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As an addition: A recent report exposed how Russia wants to drain Europe's investigative resources with its sabotage campaign, according to officials

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German prosecutors are investigating a failed attack on a substation near Düsseldorf, in the west of the country, days after a similar incident triggered a power blackout in Berlin.

Police started a probe after a letter accepting responsibility from the radical left-wing group known as Kommando Angry Birds was published on the Indymedia platform on Jan. 5, Attorney General Wolf-Tilman Baumert said.

It remains unclear when the attack took place, he said. Investigators said an incendiary device was deployed, but declined to give details.

Germany is on alert after Berlin suffered its longest power outage in decades, caused by an arson attack on a cable bridge, also claimed by a left-wing extremist group. Electricity was fully restored on Wednesday.

German federal prosecutors on Tuesday said they had launched a terrorism investigation into an arson attack on high-voltage cables that triggered a power blackout affecting about 45,000 households in Berlin.

Prosecutors said they were probing Saturday's attack on suspicion of "membership in a terrorist organization, sabotage, arson and disruption of public services."

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The attack was claimed online by a far-left extremist group calling itself Vulkangruppe, or Volcano Group.

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Berlin Mayor Kai Wegner condemned the attack, saying "suspected left-wing extremists knowingly put lives at risk, especially those of patients in hospitals, as well as the elderly, children and families."

As of Tuesday, about 24,700 households and 1,120 businesses were still without power.

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Berlin emergency services, supported by the army and charity groups, initially scrambled to help those affected to warm accommodation, including care home residents. Hotels, schools and sports centers were also used to supply shelter.

Emergency measures remain in place, with the German military providing logistic help and fueling emergency generators. Public swimming pools have been opened around the clock to allow residents to shower and warm up. About 20 schools remain closed, and public transport buses have been deployed as temporary warming shelters.

The Bundestag's interior committee is set to receive a briefing on the attack later this week, as authorities continue to rule out foreign involvement and focus their investigation on domestic left-wing extremism.

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cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/6540914

Op-ed by British MP Iain Duncan Smith.

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The time has come for the UK to wield its sanctions authority against the officials responsible for repression in Hong Kong. Jimmy Lai’s guilty conviction for “foreign collusion” and “sedition” on December 15, which paves the way for Hong Kong’s courts to sentence the 78-year-old British citizen to life in prison, is the final straw.

Beijing has trashed the Sino-British Joint Declaration, crushed the freedoms it promised Hongkongers and imprisoned nearly 2,000 political prisoners, including Lai.

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Last year, Britain rightly issued Magnitsky-style sanctions targeting the ringleaders of people-smuggling gangs, Georgian judges involved in money laundering and media moguls peddling Russian disinformation, freezing their property, bank accounts and other assets. In contrast, the human rights abusers in Hong Kong continue to act with impunity.

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The three judges responsible for Lai’s guilty verdict — Alex Lee, Esther Toh and Susana D’Almada Remedios — two of whom were called to the Bar in London, should be immediate targets. The authorities pledged that Hong Kong’s draconian National Security Law (NSL) would not be applied retrospectively, and yet all but a sliver of their 855-page judgment on Lai refers to activities that took place before the NSL’s imposition in June 2020.

It is not too late for Britain to show the authorities in Beijing and Hong Kong that the legal process in Hong Kong has become a sham.

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South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan are all closely monitoring European security. While they share many of the challenges that European countries are grappling with, and the two theaters are growing ever closer together, opportunities for deepening defense ties are opening.

Europe is viewed as an important export market for defense manufacturers, a partner for joint development and exercises, and a valued provider of equipment and capacity-building. For European countries and the EU, this opens up new opportunities to diversify their own defense partnerships. As the Europeans are trying to become less dependent on the US and ramp up production at home, Indo-Pacific countries present themselves as natural cooperation partners.

• Russia is intensifying covert attacks on key infrastructure in Germany as a possible prelude to a wider conflict, according to a military document.
• Germany expects to be targeted by Russia covertly via hybrid attacks on energy and defense infrastructure as it positions itself as NATO's main hub in Europe.
• The defense ministry views Russia as "the greatest and most immediate threat to Germany's security" and says hybrid measures are a tool used by Russia in its security policy and fight against the "collective West".

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“The hybrid measures and attacks that have been identified, particularly those carried out in Germany, should be seen as a tool deliberately used by Russia in its security policy and its fight against the ‘collective West.’ At the same time, these measures could also serve as preparation for military conflict,” the German defense ministry said.

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The defense ministry plan ... cited national and foreign intelligence that suggested Russia is seeking to develop capabilities and strategic options to wage and survive a large-scale war against NATO.

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“However, Russia will do everything in its power to prevent or at least hinder the deployment of NATO forces on the eastern flank for the purposes of deterrence and, if necessary, defense,” it said.

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The defense ministry concluded that Russia is deliberately targeting and exploring possible weak links in cooperation between different levels of German government with hybrid measures designed to unsettle citizens.

“The aim is to prevent the early detection of these hybrid measures and their actual extent and impact, and to slow down and paralyze our decision-making and response capabilities of the various responsible parties at federal, state and local level.”

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cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/6508428

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Police [in the UK] are investigating after Chinese officials were accused of photographing protesters outside Beijing’s proposed new mega-embassy in London.

Sir Mark Rowley, the Metropolitan Police commissioner, has been told that the incident — reported by a Hong Kong dissident who fled persecution under China’s draconian security laws — could be part of a wider pattern of intimidation and surveillance of exiles and democracy activists in the UK.

Chi Hei Dai, who was part of the 2019 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, took part in two peaceful protests against the planned embassy on February 8 and March 15 last year and says he and other demonstrators were photographed by Chinese officials from inside the Royal Mint Court buildings.

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The Royal Mint Court, a historic site near the Tower of London, is at the centre of a political row over China’s plans to build a vast new embassy complex. The government estimates the new facility could bring as many as 200 extra Chinese diplomats to the capital, sparking alarm among human rights groups and exiled communities who fear it could become a hub for surveillance and intimidation. A final decision on whether to grant the site planning permission is expected on January 20 — Sir Keir Starmer is due to travel to Beijing at the end of the month.

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Chi reported the incident to the Metropolitan Police on December 22 under Section 3 of the National Security Act 2023, which criminalises assisting foreign intelligence services and covers conduct likely to materially help such services with UK-related activities — even if done covertly. The law was designed to counter foreign interference and protect national interests, extending well beyond traditional espionage.

He had not made a report at the time because he believed the Royal Mint had diplomatic status, shielding it from police investigations. When he realised this might not be the case, in the last fortnight he attended Sutton police station, where officers created an “intelligence report”.

The information has now been passed to Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) London and specialist officers are assessing whether further action is required.

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[Conservative MP} Duncan Smith initially condemned the police response as “astonishing” and “crass” after Chi was advised by one officer to contact the Hong Kong embassy and police force — despite the fact that Hong Kong does not have an embassy and is part of China.

“I am surprised that someone in the employment of the Metropolitan Police doesn’t seem to realise that Hong Kong is now part of China which has imposed the Chinese national security law in contravention of the Sino-British agreement and are arresting peaceful democracy campaigners like Chi Hei Dai,” Duncan Smith wrote. “In light of the threats Hong Kong dissidents face, such advice looks crass.”

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Another officer reportedly told Chi to seek help from Citizens Advice, rather than treating the matter as a potential national security problem.

The legal status of the Royal Mint Court is central to the case. Unlike the Chinese consulate in Manchester, where Chinese officials assaulted a Hong Kong protester in 2022, the Royal Mint Court is not a diplomatic premises and is therefore not covered by diplomatic immunity. This means that Chinese embassy employees at the site are subject to UK law, including the National Security Act 2023.

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The incident is the latest in a series of alarming episodes involving Chinese officials targeting dissidents and activists in the UK.

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Human rights organisations have documented a sophisticated campaign of transnational repression by the Chinese state, targeting Hong Kong democracy activists, Uighurs and other dissidents in the UK. Tactics include physical and digital surveillance, threats to family members in China, online harassment, and the misuse of international legal mechanisms to pursue critics abroad.

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