The ideas here in this post are not without precedent. I look up to initiaves like Gaia-X with cautious optimism. However, I believe it is important, nevertheless, to put them out in the public and discuss them ever so often.
Like roads, ports, and power grids, data centers have become critical infrastructure. They underpin almost every function of a modern economy: commerce, communication, healthcare, public administration, defense, and scientific research. Treating them as optional or purely private assets no longer reflects economic reality. The question is therefore not whether they are essential, but whether it is prudent to rely almost exclusively on private, often foreign, providers to operate them.
There are two compelling reasons for the state to offer a public option in data center and cloud infrastructure (amongst others).
First, a public option would introduce natural competitive pressure into a market that is increasingly concentrated. Hyperscale cloud providers benefit from extreme economies of scale, network effects, and high switching costs, which together weaken meaningful price competition. This creates a real risk of price gouging, vendor lock-in, and unilateral changes to terms of service that users, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and public institutions, are powerless to resist. A state-backed alternative does not need to dominate the market to be effective; it only needs to exist as a credible option to discipline pricing and behavior across the sector.
Second, a public offering would provide a genuine guarantee of service for critical systems. Certain workloads (public registries, healthcare platforms, emergency services, scientific archives, and strategic industries) should not be subject to abrupt commercial pressures, geopolitical risk, or shareholder-driven priorities. By enabling these systems to be hosted on publicly owned infrastructure, states can ensure long-term continuity, transparency, and sovereignty, while still benefiting from modern tooling and professional operations.
It is increasingly popular, particularly in open-source circles, to imagine a future in which self-hosting replaces large-scale cloud services. While admirable in spirit, this vision underestimates the economic reality of infrastructure. Self-hosting loses competitiveness precisely where reliability, redundancy, security, and energy efficiency matter most. These are domains where economies of scale are decisive. Expecting individuals, nonprofits, or small organizations to replicate them independently is neither realistic nor efficient. The economies of scale are just not on the side of this strategy.
A state-backed option represents a pragmatic middle ground. Like public transportation, water utilities, or postal services, it leverages collective funding through taxation to achieve scale that no individual contributor could reasonably attain. Crucially, this does not preclude private innovation or competition. Instead, it ensures that essential services remain accessible, affordable, and more resilient.
Part of the resistance to this idea stems from the persistent mystification of data centers and web services. There is a widespread belief that only “Big Tech” can operate them competently. In reality, the technical knowledge required has never been more accessible. Decades of best practices, open standards, and free documentation are available to anyone willing to apply them. What Big Tech primarily offers is not secret knowledge, but capital concentration and scale (both of which governments already possess). I believe this is an important notion we need to spread more diligently. Without a doubt, new agencies created for these purposes will make mistakes, but they will be necessary learning steps towards the provision of an essential service.
At the European level, the opportunity is especially clear. Twenty-seven economies, aligned by regulatory frameworks and shared interests, could establish interoperable, publicly owned infrastructure following common standards. Such an initiative would reduce dependency on American providers, strengthen digital sovereignty, and dramatically improve access to high-quality networking and computing services for SMEs, startups, and public institutions.
However, such an effort would need to begin at the national level to prove its viability. Pilot projects, limited-scope public clouds, and targeted use cases would allow governments to validate the model before broader adoption. But the potential upside (economic resilience, strategic autonomy, fairer competition, long-term cost control) is substantial.
In short, treating data centers as public infrastructure is neither radical nor unprecedented. It is a rational response to their growing centrality in modern life. The question is no longer whether states can do this, but whether they can afford not to.
No one is arguing that Europe should avoid involvement in the Middle East; the question is how Europe should engage. The notion that further antagonizing Iran or destabilizing the Middle East, especially through direct conflict, would somehow benefit European interests is not just deeply flawed; it is delusional.
The moral argument against Iran’s regime is beyond dispute. We can all agree that the regime is reprehensible, but we must also carefully assess the direct repercussions for European interests:
Economic Fallout: Europe’s energy security and trade routes depend on Middle Eastern stability. A major conflict would disrupt oil and gas supplies, send energy prices soaring, and fuel inflation at a time when European economies are already fragile. The 2022 energy crisis demonstrated just how vulnerable Europe is to regional instability. Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz means any escalation risks severing critical supply lines. If Europe becomes reliant on the US for regional stability, it effectively becomes a hostage to American policy.
Migration and Security: Instability in the Middle East has repeatedly triggered mass displacement and migration waves toward Europe. A collapsed Iranian regime or prolonged conflict would likely intensify this, straining European borders, resources, and political cohesion. The result would be a new migration crisis, further empowering far-right parties and undermining European institutions.
Terrorism and Radicalization: A destabilized Iran or a regional power vacuum could embolden extremist groups, increasing the risk of terrorism in Europe. For all its flaws, Iran’s current regime at least acts as a counterweight to groups like ISIS. Its collapse could unleash chaos that spills over into Europe through radicalized networks or direct attacks. European civilians would likely pay the price for this war and, in effect, for Israel’s foreign policy objectives.
Diplomatic Isolation: Europe’s global influence rests on its ability to act as a mediator and uphold international law. Openly advocating for regime change or conflict (without a clear plan for the aftermath) would alienate partners, erode Europe’s moral standing, and tie it to hardline US or Israeli policies that many Europeans oppose. It would also complicate negotiations on issues like nuclear proliferation or regional conflicts. Moreover, this war lacks legal justification. Spain’s position is perfectly understandable, especially when considering the broader context of US politics, which must be factored in, given that the US is driving the war effort.
Strategic Dependence: Europe is not the US; it lacks the military or economic leverage to unilaterally shape outcomes in the Middle East. Antagonizing Iran would force Europe to either blindly align with US-Israeli actions (losing autonomy) or face retaliation (cyberattacks, proxy conflicts, or economic pressure) without the means to respond effectively. This underscores Europe’s vulnerability in securing trade routes in the short term, before it can develop independent capabilities.
Long-Term Instability: Regime change rarely leads to stable, pro-Western democracies; more often, it creates failed states or hostile governments. A fragmented Iran could become a haven for warlords, extremists, or rival powers like Russia or China (none of which serve European interests). Even among Iranian supporters of liberal reforms, there is widespread contempt for the West. Europe gains nothing by being lumped in with the US and becoming a target for a new generation of Iranian terrorists.
Rising Oil Prices and Russian War Funding: Instability in the Middle East inevitably drives up global oil prices, which directly bolsters Russia’s war economy. Higher oil revenues enable Moscow to sustain and even expand its military mobilization, placing both Europe and Ukraine in an even more precarious strategic position.
In short, while the current Iranian regime is deeply problematic, the war unleashed by Trump and the Republican Party (and the potential collapse of Iran) would pose far greater risks to Europe than the status quo. The prudent course is de-escalation, diplomacy, and pushing for reform, not betting on chaos.
US politics are absolutely relevant here: The US is the driving force behind this escalation, and Europe cannot ignore this reality. Trump is desperate to bury the Epstein scandal and hopes a war and terrorism will distract from his economic policy failures. Leaks suggest that top Republican circles around Trump are hoping to provoke a crisis that could justify martial law and greater control over elections, or even their suspension. Meanwhile, Big Tech is aggressively lobbying Washington to take a stand against European regulation, as seen in the recent exchange between Musk and the Spanish government. The US is well aware of how damaging this war would be for Europe, and very likely is counting on it to fragment the EU and sow division.
And you think Spain, or any reasonable nation, should not condemn these attacks?