this post was submitted on 10 Aug 2024
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[–] mctoasterson@reddthat.com 178 points 3 months ago (49 children)

Since the story came out people fixated on "lol he used a shitty gaming controller" but really that is one of the least sketchy design choices in the entire rig. Why reinvent the wheel and make a custom set of controls that are realistically another huge expense and potential failure point, when off the shelf solutions exist for that component?

The corners that were cut are the ones involving the viewport/nose adhesion to the ships frame, and the structural integrity of the carbon fiber hull itself. They had test data suggesting it was a bad idea to engage in repeated dives with their design, and an even worse idea to operate at the depths they chose. They decided to ignore that.

[–] deranger@sh.itjust.works 10 points 3 months ago* (last edited 3 months ago) (10 children)

Using commercial off the shelf technology without proper testing and certification is absolutely cutting corners. See: Kaprun disaster.

What kind of fire rating did those COTS parts throughout the interior of the vessel have? What kind of redundancy existed? Would you use a Logitech controller for a spacecraft? The requirements of deep sea submersibles and spacecraft are quite similar. Would any of the submersible certification agencies approved this? I think not.

I see the Logitech controller, the carbon fiber hull, and so many other decisions he made as symptoms of the same corner cutting, “move fast and break things” mentality he had.

[–] mox@lemmy.sdf.org 10 points 3 months ago* (last edited 3 months ago) (7 children)

Using commercial off the shelf technology without proper testing and certification is absolutely cutting corners. See: Kaprun disaster.

I just read the wikipedia article; thanks for mentioning it.

I'm not sure it's a good example of your point, though. Notably:

the cause was the failure, overheating and ignition of a fan heater in the conductor's compartments which was not designed for use in a moving vehicle.

The onboard electric power, hydraulic braking systems, and fan heaters intended for domestic use increased the likelihood of fire.

The fan heater is the only off-the-shelf technology listed here, and there's no suggestion that it was part of the train's design. It seems likely that a train conductor brought it on board to keep the compartment warm through the workday. Still a bad idea in a train, especially on a 30° slope, but not an example of the designers cutting corners.

Edit:

Thanks to others for linking photos and a report (in German) that show how the heater was installed. It was clearly not a case of a conductor just setting the heater on the floor, but the installation still looks very much out of place. Perhaps corner-cutting was involved, but this doesn't look like something done by the train designers. Even an expensive industrial heater seems like it would be an extraordinarily bad idea in that location, right up against high-pressure hydraulic oil lines. Does someone have the details behind it? It looks more likely a (very foolish) modification made by someone else, like maybe the train operators.

For anyone else following this, those hydraulic oil lines that the heater was nearly touching were apparently pressurized at 190 bar, which I think is about 2700 pounds per square inch.

[–] llii@discuss.tchncs.de 3 points 3 months ago (1 children)

It was not a train conductor that brought it with him, it was build into the train by the train manufacturer. See this page: https://155.at/der-heizluefter/

[–] mox@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 3 months ago* (last edited 3 months ago) (2 children)

it was build into the train by the train manufacturer.

What makes you think the train manufacturer did it? Is that on record someplace? Because the installation and materials don't look at all like the surrounding work. Looks more like a handyman hack job. Now that I've seen the photos, I'm curious about what actually happened there.

[–] a_wild_mimic_appears@lemmy.dbzer0.com 3 points 3 months ago* (last edited 3 months ago) (1 children)

It was not the train manufacturer, but a body shop (Swoboda Karosserie- und Stahlbau GesmbH, now Carvatech), which was recruited by the Gletscherbahn Kaprun (GBK) for renovations. It might have not had so large repercussions if anyone of the actors during those renovations had done his job correctly tho:

  • the model chosen was for household use and chosen because the recommended fan heater was unavailable
  • other departments of Swoboda (and because of that, everyone else) were not informed about this change, even leading to sending out the documentation of the recommended fan heater to GBK
  • the fan heater was mounted in a way that allowed liquids to leak inside of it
  • it was mounted directly in front of the hydraulics, which contained flammable liquids
  • those hydraulics were redone during the renovations by Mannesmann-Rexroth AG (now Bosch Rexroth AG), and were done using plastic pipes and were not appropriately encased.
  • They started melting because of the malfunctioning heater, spraying flammable oil at 190 bar into the fire
  • the dropping oil pressure caused the train to automatically break
  • but the hydraulics were also needed to open the goddamn doors.

On top of all that, because the cable cars were made of aluminium, they were deemed inflammable. This did not take into account that any installed equipment or passengers and their luggage might NOT be fireproof.

This lead to: no fire exits, no emergency signage, no training for employees how to react in case of fire. (which might have saved a lot of people: the 12 survivors were the people who went downwards, passing the fire, because they listened to a fireman onboard the cable car.)

it was a single malfunctioning heater, but the Kaprun disaster had many fathers.

I found a nice paper regarding the different actors written by a student of the University of Virginia here, well sourced.

[–] mox@lemmy.sdf.org 2 points 3 months ago

Very informative. Thank you!

[–] llii@discuss.tchncs.de 1 points 3 months ago* (last edited 3 months ago)

I need to cite the German Wikipedia article, which I’ve read. It’s a good read and very long.

Abschließend wurde festgehalten: „Als Ergebnis der Ermittlungen der Staatsanwaltschaft Heilbronn lässt sich feststellen, dass sich das Unglück am 11. November 2000 hätte vermeiden lassen können, wenn seitens der Fa. Swoboda fahrzeuggeeignete Heizlüfter eingebaut worden wären, die es auf dem Markt gab.“

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