Selfhosted

Npm has gotten a few config options that prevent this behaviour. We can only hope that they will become the default eventually.

That article has lots of issues:

17% of the most popular Rust packages contain code that virtually nobody knows what it does

That's not true at all, the article where he got that information from says:

Only 8 crate versions straight up don’t match their upstream repositories. None of these were malicious: seven were updates from vendored upstreams (such as wrapped C libraries) that weren’t represented in their repository at the point the crate version was published, and the last was the inadvertent inclusion of .github files that hadn’t yet been pushed to the GitHub repository.

So, of the 999 most popular crates analyzed 0% contains code nobody knows what it does.

He then lists some ways packages can be maliciously compromised:

1. Steal credentials and impersonate a dev
2. Misleading package names
3. Malicious macros (this one is interesting, had never considered it before)
4. Malicious build script

And his solutions are:

1. Bigger std library (solves none of the above)
2. Source dependencies (solves none of the issues he showed, only the issue that happens in 0% of packages where binary doesn't match the source and is detectable)
3. Decentralized packages (which worsens every security concern)
4. Centralized Checksum database (so a centralized package manager is bad, but a centralized Checksum index is good? How does that work?)

Honestly I can't take that article seriously, it grossly misinterpreted another study, presents problems that exist on every single package manager ever, doesn't propose ANY valid solution, and the only thing he points to as a solution suffers from ALL of the same issues and then some.

In a recent analysis, Adam Harvey found that among the 999 most popular crates on crates.io, around 17% contained code that do not match their code repository.

17%!

Let me rephrase this, 17% of the most popular Rust packages contain code that virtually nobody knows what it does (I can't imagine about the long tail which receives less attention).

Given that he lied about the results of the analysis he is using to prove his point, I find it hard to trust anything in this article.

In the analysis, Harvey said only 8 repositories did not match their upstream repos. The other problems were issues like not including the VCS info, squashing history, etc.

EDIT: Also, I just noticed that he called it a "recent" analysis. It's roughly a two year old analysis. I expect things have improved a bit since then, especially since part of the problem was packaging using older versions of Cargo.

The good news is that there already is a gold standard for supply chain security: the Go programming language.

Lmfao

Thanks for the link. There have been a few people in this thread making this point, and I was considering asking them to elaborate so that I can gauge what my risk is from using pip for python. I appreciate you providing a resource so I can go learn more about this