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Interestingly, developers in ecosystems like Go, Rust, and those utilizing native Web APIs—where robust standard libraries drastically reduce reliance on third-party code and strict cryptographic verification is built into the core toolchain—reported zero instances of a college dropout’s weekend project wiping out global logistics infrastructure today.
As someone who's built a career in Rust, it is 100% susceptible to an attack like this. The community is just generally paranoid enough to avoid depending on super niche packages.
Even so, Cargo still doesn't have code signing and crates.io doesn't have 2FA. They just barely rolled out email alerts for new crates being published with your API key.
And there's dozens of single-author crates that are depended upon by millions of lines of code, any one of which could easily be a vector in a supply chain attack. In fact there have been attempted supply chain attacks against crates.io, but to my knowledge they've all relied on typo-squatting.
We're definitely overdue for a major attack.