citytree

Examples of passive defenses against surveillance:

• Privacy Badger
• uBlock Origin
• Using open source Linux rather than Microsoft Windows
• etc.

But why not actively combat surveillance instead of passively defending against it? Examples of active combat:

• AdNauseam
• ScareMail
• Emacs spook.el

We must poison the data of those who are violating our privacy. Let us waste their time, increase their data storage costs, and waste their processing power. Let them drown in an ocean of data. Let them search for tiny needles in huge haystacks, with no way to distinguish between needles and hay.

Some ideas:

• Sending fake data to Google Analytics (How does Google Analytics prevent fake data attacks against an entity's traffic?)
• Create fake contacts lists to mislead those who are building social network graphs.
• Encrypt lots of worthless data, store them in the cloud or send them by email. If the encrypted data is intercepted by any nosy entity, they will have to waste storage space while waiting to be able to break the encryption.

What are some other possible methods?

Let us turn the tables on those who have been violating our privacy. Why do we have to be on the defense? Let us waste their resources in the same way that they are wasting ours!

For those who have installed Signal Desktop in Linux, do you use an AppArmor profile to harden the program? If so, can you share your AppArmor profile for Signal Desktop?

I am using Mozilla Firefox as my web browser. I have configured it to clear cookies, active logins, form & search history, and offline website data when I close Firefox. Should I also configure it to clear the cache? What are the privacy implications if I don't clear the cache?

EDIT: additional information:

• My goal is to reduce fingerprinting and tracking by websites.
• I use Mozilla Firefox on my personal laptop that almost never leaves my residence. The laptop has full disk encryption. I am the only user of the laptop.
• I don’t erase my web browser history. I want to keep browser history for my future reference.

My mother uses a prepaid phone plan where mobile data usage is charged by the megabyte. It is currently not cost-effective to switch to a monthly fixed-cost subscription plan.

• When she is at home, she should:
  • Switch off mobile data.
  • Switch on WiFi (because her home WiFi has a fixed monthly cost).
• When she is outside home, she should:
  • Switch on mobile data (so that others can contact her using messaging apps such as Signal and WhatsApp).
  • Switch off WiFi (to conserve battery).

The problem: she often forgets to do the above. Sometimes she leaves home without switching on mobile data. Sometimes she accidentally uses lots of mobile data when at home.

Is there an app that can automatically switch on/off mobile data and WiFi based on the phone’s location? Location should be detected based on all the following data: latitude/longitude coordinates (if location is enabled on phone), WiFi networks in range (if WiFi is enabled on phone), and cell tower signals (if airplane mode is not on).

We would strongly prefer to use a privacy-respecting open source app for this. Phone: Samsung Galaxy A series. OS: Android 13.

Are there any open source apps that can version control text files in Android? I don't necessarily need something with lots of features like Git. Even something similar to RCS would be sufficient for me.

If websites are able to track their users' typing behavior and mouse movements, then the websites may be able to use that data to fingerprint, track, and possibly identify their users. Is this a real privacy risk? If so, what are the methods to counter keyboard and mouse fingerprinting by websites? Note that I do not want to disable JavaScript.

Does user privacy when using WhatsApp Web (https://web.whatsapp.com) differ substantially from using WhatsApp on Android? WhatsApp on Android has end-to-end encryption and (optional) encrypted backups. If I use WhatsApp Web, will Meta be able to see the contents of my WhatsApp messages?

Is there some kind of website that has a database of whether or not an app would require Google Play Services to function? I remember using just such a website a few weeks ago, but I don't remember its name. It has a search box where one enters the app name and it will tell you whether or not that app relies on Google Play Services.

Is there any open source and privacy-respecting Android keyboard for Chinese input? I want to avoid proprietary keyboards such as Gboard and Samsung Keyboard. Unfortunately, the open source Android keyboards that I found only support alphabetic input:

• OpenBoard
• AnySoftKeyboard
• Simple Keyboard

For Chinese input I would like pinyin input for both traditional characters and simplified characters. Handwriting input would be nice to have but it is not essential.

I have installed both uBlock Origin and NoScript in Firefox. Does it make sense to use both at the same time? I was wondering whether or not uBlock Origin is able to do everything that NoScript does. If not, what does NoScript have that uBlock Origin does not?

Not sure if any of you have encountered the same resistance to using Signal. Some of my cousins refused to use Signal because they are already using "too many chat apps" (e.g. WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, WeChat, Telegram, Line, Snapchat, etc.). To them, Signal will just be another chat app among their numerous other chat apps. I understand that jumping between so many messaging apps imposes some kind of cognitive and maintenance burden. What are some ways to convince such people to use Signal?

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/789646

An official FBI document dated January 2021, obtained by the American association "Property of People" through the Freedom of Information Act.

This document summarizes the possibilities for legal access to data from nine instant messaging services: iMessage, Line, Signal, Telegram, Threema, Viber, WeChat, WhatsApp and Wickr. For each software, different judicial methods are explored, such as subpoena, search warrant, active collection of communications metadata ("Pen Register") or connection data retention law ("18 USC§2703"). Here, in essence, is the information the FBI says it can retrieve:

• Apple iMessage: basic subscriber data; in the case of an iPhone user, investigators may be able to get their hands on message content if the user uses iCloud to synchronize iMessage messages or to back up data on their phone.

• Line: account data (image, username, e-mail address, phone number, Line ID, creation date, usage data, etc.); if the user has not activated end-to-end encryption, investigators can retrieve the texts of exchanges over a seven-day period, but not other data (audio, video, images, location).

• Signal: date and time of account creation and date of last connection.

• Telegram: IP address and phone number for investigations into confirmed terrorists, otherwise nothing.

• Threema: cryptographic fingerprint of phone number and e-mail address, push service tokens if used, public key, account creation date, last connection date.

• Viber: account data and IP address used to create the account; investigators can also access message history (date, time, source, destination).

• WeChat: basic data such as name, phone number, e-mail and IP address, but only for non-Chinese users.

• WhatsApp: the targeted person's basic data, address book and contacts who have the targeted person in their address book; it is possible to collect message metadata in real time ("Pen Register"); message content can be retrieved via iCloud backups.

• Wickr: Date and time of account creation, types of terminal on which the application is installed, date of last connection, number of messages exchanged, external identifiers associated with the account (e-mail addresses, telephone numbers), avatar image, data linked to adding or deleting.

TL;DR Signal is the messaging system that provides the least information to investigators.