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Maybe each camera could have a unique private key that it could use to watermark keyframes with a hash of the frames themselves.
How would you prove that the camera itself is real, is the only device with access to the private key and isn't falsifying it's video feed?
The sort of case I was thinking of is if different parties present different versions of an image or video and you want to establish which version is altered and which is original.
You still have the same problem though. You can produce a camera in court and reject one of the images, but you still need to prove that the camera wasn't tampered with and it was the one at the scene of the crime.
Leica has one camera that does this, and others are working on them. Just posted this link in another comment
The camera can sign things however it wishes, but that doesn't automatically make the camera trustworthy.
In the same sense, I can sign any number of documents claiming to have seen a crime take place but that doesn't make it sufficient evidence.
In this case, digitally signing an image verifies that the image was generated by a specific camera (not just any camera of that brand) and that the image generated by that camera looks such and such a way. If anyone further edits the image the hash won't match the one from the signature, so it will be apparent it was tampered with.
What it can't do is tell you if someone pasted a printout of some false image over the lens, or in some other sophisticated way presented a doctored scene to the camera. But there's nothing preventing us from doing that today.
The question was about deepfakes right? So this is one tool to address that, but certainly not the only one the legal system would want to use.
I think that’s exactly how it’s going to work - you can’t force all ‘fake’ sources to have signatures- it’s too easy to make one without one for malicious reasons. Instead you have to create trusted sources of real images. Much easier and more secure
Usually I see non-technical people throw ideas like this and they're stupid, but I've been thinking about this for a few minutes and it's actually kinda smart